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Abstract 
This paper questions why a number of leading academics and politicians have 
ignored recent findings by Statistics New Zealand that support a prima facie 
case that the individualisation of workplace contracts in that country during the 
1990s was associated with - contrary to earlier findings - relatively high labour 
productivity growth. Attention is drawn to updated estimates of Australian and New 
Zealand labour productivity growth. These updated data confirm the relatively high 
average rate of growth of labour productivity in New Zealand during the 1990s 
when workplace contracts were being individualised. Caution is, nonetheless, 
recommended when making claims about the determinants of labour productivity 
growth as, apart from significant measurement difficulties, workplace arrangements 
are not the only determinant of labour productivity. 
1. Introduction 
The introduction of the Workplace Relations Amendment (WorkChoices) Act 2005 
(abbreviated to WorkChoices) in late 2005 has generated much commentary (e.g. 
151 Academics 2005, Wooden 2006). In essence, WorkChoices, which came into 
operation in March 2006, radically rearranged labour market regulations so as to 
reduce, among other things, the role and power of trade unions and the Australian 
Industrial Relations Commission. Trade unions - already somewhat enfeebled 
by a couple of decades of declining membership- had their legal rights to gather 
members and to organise strikes severely curtailed. The Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission (AIRC), which had also had its authority diminished 
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over the years by various earlier legislative changes, saw its role, as a disputes 
adjudicator, further reduced. Unfair dismissal legislation, originally introduced 
in 1994, was dismantled for firms hiring 100 or fewer employees, and for larger 
firms, new limits were placed on the scope of the former legislation. Also, a new 
Fair Pay Commission was established to determine minimum wage rates, taking 
over a role formerly assigned to the AIRC. 
The central purpose ofWorkChoices has been to individualise workplace relations 
between employees and employers and reduce the role and influence of third parties 
in the process of determining wages and conditions, which means reducing the 
role of unions and the quasi-judicial AIRC. The move to individualising contractual 
arrangements between employers and employees in Australia is similar in its 
purpose, though not in its execution (Moore 2005), to that adopted earlier in 
New Zealand when the Employment Contracts Act 1991 (abbreviated to ECA) 
was introduced. The ECA, which was in place from May 1991 to October 2000, 
reduced the power and privileges of trade unions. For many years, unions in New 
Zealand had played a central role in the determination of wages and conditions. 
The ECA effectively brought an end to that era. Unions lost their special status as 
representatives of labour. The New Zealand system of conciliation and arbitration, 
which had been very similar to the Australian system (indeed, was a predecessor 
of the Australian system), all but ceased to exist with the introduction of the ECA. 
The determination of wages and conditions came, over time, to be predominantly 
determined on an individual basis (Deeks and Rasmussen 2002, Rasmussen 
2004, Rasmussen and Lamm 2005, Walsh et al. 2004). Union membership 
fell, with union density (the percentage of employees who are union members) 
approximately halving to a density rate of around 22 per cent by 2000. That rate 
has largely remained in place since the ECA was amended in 2000 (Victoria 
University of Wellington 2006, Blackwood et al. 2006). 
While much has been written about the impact of the ECA on New Zealand, an 
often-repeated claims is that labour productivity did not significantly improve in New 
Zealand during the years of the ECA. From this it is inferred, not unreasonably on 
the face of things, that there is no obvious basis for assuming that Australia will 
fair any better than New Zealand in its attempts to improve labour productivity 
by individualising workplace relations. Thus recent commentaries by Brendan 
O'Connor (2007) and Quiggin (2007), among others, are dismissive of any 
significant link between individualised workplace contracts and labour productivity. 
Similarly Peetz (2007), in a more detailed analysis of productivity, comes to much 
the same ultimate conclusion. 
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This paper will question the continued strong support for the case that New 
Zealand's labour market productivity growth was weak during the years when the 
ECA was in place. By implication, it will be suggested that- notwithstanding the 
many complexities and paradoxes associated with measuring and explaining labour 
productivity- a prima facie case can be mounted that, at a macroeconomic level, 
the individualization of workplace contracts has not been harmfully associated 
with aggregate labour productivity growth in New Zealand. Accordingly, the next 
section of this paper will review the macroeconomic evidence and arguments 
mounted in support of the view that individualizing workplace contracts has been 
associated with relatively weak labour productivity growth, particularly in New 
Zealand, and lackluster per capita GDP growth. The subsequent section will argue 
that caution is required in the use of productivity estimates- official or otherwise 
- because of the numerous limitations associated with the various sources. The 
final section will offer some concluding thoughts. 
2. Considering the Evidence 
Workplace regulation appears to be an important policy lever. Governments are 
continually either tinkering with or overhauling workplace regulations or, just as 
often, re-organising the administration of pre-existing workplace regulations. 
The shape and tone of workplace legislation is, therefore, a major political and 
economic issue. But policy makers need to be well informed when drafting and 
re-drafting policy. 
In this regard it is of interest to note recent comments by Brendan O'Connor 
(2007), who is the Shadow Parliamentary Secretary for Industrial Relations and 
Chair of the Federal Labor Parliamentary Industrial Relations Taskforce. O'Connor 
is highly critical of both the Australian Government's WorkChoices legislation and 
New Zealand's ECA legislation. For example, with respect to labour productivity 
he writes (among other things): 
In July 2005, in a speech to the Sydney Institute, the Prime Minister used 
the New Zealand experience as a rationale for his position. But when closely 
examined, there is no evidence to support the claim. 
Paul Dalziel in the Review of Political Economy in 2002 established that 
productivity and wages actually fell after the New Zealand Government began 
forcing people onto individual contracts with the enactment of the Employments 
Contracts Act 1991. This study exposed the myth. 
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The New Zealand economy lost almost two per cent of GOP between 1987 
and 1998. More telling perhaps, and by way of comparison, from 1990 to 
1998 Australian productivity rose by 21.9 per cent compared with a mere 5.2 
per cent in New Zealand. 
In the above quote, O'Connor refers to a study by Dalziel (2002), who found labour 
productivity growth to be weak in New Zealand compared to Australia during the 
period of the ECA between 1991 and 1998. These data are reproduced in Figure 
1. And they confirm his claim. 1 
Figure 1: Labour Productivity Estimates for Australia and New Zealand 
Dalziel's (2002) Total Economy Estimates 
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At this point it should be noted that when Dalziel prepared his estimates of 
labour productivity, there were no official estimates of labour productivity in New 
Zealand. Australian official estimates of labour productivity from the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (ABS), on the other hand, were available. The ABS estimates 
were and remain based on the 'market' sector, which makes up about two thirds 
of the total economy. Dalziel's estimates of labour productivity were related to 
the total economy for both countries. A number of other studies of New Zealand 
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labour productivity suggested relatively weak labour productivity. Figure 2 depicts 
estimates of the ratio of New Zealand to Australian labour productivity by Diewert 
and Lawrence (1999), Dalziel (2002), Black et al. (2003) and TCB/GGCD (2007) 
2 for all or most of the years of the ECA (1991-2000) and beyond. The general 
shape of the lines in Figure 2 tell a similar story to that advanced by Dalziel, 
though the extent of the relative decline according to Dalziel's estimates is a little 
more acute than is the case for the other selected estimates. 
Figure 2: Relative Labour Productivity Estimates by Selected Studies 
Indexes of the Ratio of New Zealand to Australian Values 
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Like O'Connor, Peetz (2007) draws on the work of Dalziel to support his negative 
overall assessment of the individualisation of workplace contracts in Australia 
and New Zealand. Thus in response to a positive assessment of WorkChoices 
by Pearson (2007), Peetz writes: 
Some have suggested that this poor productivity performance is simply the 
arithmetical result of the entry of semi-skilled and unskilled workers into the 
workforce as a result of WorkChoices (Pearson 2007). However, at less 
than 18 per cent, the share of 'unskilled' workers (labourers and elementary 
clerical sales and service workers) in the workforce has been, during the past 
three quarters, the lowest average on record (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
6291.0). 
---------------------------------------- ----
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We would not expect these declines to continue indefinitely- a rise in productivity 
must occur sometime soon. But from these data, and from extensive evidence 
elsewhere (Dalziel 2002; Peetz 2005), there is no reason to believe that 
WorkChoices will be able to generate a significantly higher productivity growth 
rate than occurred under the traditional award system, or would have occurred 
anyway. 
Pearson's (2007) positive assessment of WorkChoices and the individualisation 
of workplace contracts rests, in the main, on two planks. The first plank is that 
the rapid employment of relatively low-skilled workers during much of the first 
year of the operation of the WorkChoices Act has led to weakening of labour 
productivity growth. Peetz (2007) dismisses this argument, as noted above, on 
the grounds that:' ... the share of 'unskilled' workers ... in the workforce has been, 
during the past three quarters, the lowest average on record (Australian Bureau 
of Statistics, 6291.0).3 
Figure 3: Labour Productivity New Zealand Relative to Australia 
Official Estimates for Both Countries 
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 
1991=100 
2006 
Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics via Productivity Commission (2007) and Statistics New 
Zealand (2007). 
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The second plank of Pearson's positive assessment of the impact of individualising 
workplace contracts is to draw attention to Statistics New Zealand's (SNZ's) 
first-ever official estimates of productivity, i.e. labour, capital and multifactor 
productivity (see SNZ 2007a). These estimates were released in 2006, and some 
of their implications are discussed in Perry (2006, 2007). Revised and updated 
estimates were subsequently released in 2007. Figure 3 depicts the 2007 revised 
estimates of New Zealand labour productivity as a ratio of the latest Australian 
labour productivity estimates (ABS 2006, Productivity Commission 2007). Note the 
difference between the early estimates of the labour productivity ratio presented 
in Figure 2 and the more recent estimates for the measured sector in Figure 3. 
What is the significance of these recently-released official data? 
First, these data represent the most thorough estimates of productivity to date. The 
resources of SNZ are considerable and SNZ staff have access to unpublished data 
that are inaccessible or difficult to access for 'outsiders'. Second, the methodology 
involved in the construction of these data is very similar to the methodology 
employed in the construction of the official Australian data developed by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics. Thus meaningful comparisons can be made. Third, 
the official New Zealand and Australian data are for that part of the economy 
referred to as the 'market' sector in Australia and the 'measured' sector in New 
Zealand. New Zealand's measured sector excludes government administration 
and defence, health, education, property and business services, and personal 
and other community services as it is difficult to estimate productivity levels for 
these sectors; whereas those sectors that make up the 'measured sector- about 
two thirds of the total economy - more readily lend themselves to productivity 
estimates. 
A final point to note regarding the estimates of labour productivity by SNZ is that 
labour productivity growth is considerably higher than in all earlier estimates. 
From a policy point of view this is probably the most interesting feature of the new 
official estimates. This is because, whereas the earlier unofficial estimates of New 
Zealand labour productivity calculate a low rate of growth compared to Australia 
during the years of the ECA (Figure 2), the latest official estimates calculate a 
slightly higher average rate of growth compared to Australia (Figure 3). In other 
words, these new official estimates largely nullify the impression left from estimates 
embodied in Figure 2. Thus between 1991 and 2000 the new official estimates 
of labour productivity growth in New Zealand indicate an increase of 29 per cent 
which is much higher than the 5.2 per cent measure cited by O'Connor (2007). 
Over the full timeframe of the ECA years, Australia recorded an increase of 26 
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per cent. During the post-EGA period from 2000 to 2006, New Zealand's labour 
productivity increased by 7 per cent, Australia's by 13 per cent. 
Peetz's dismissal of Pearson's 'two planks' explicitly rejects the first plank and 
implicitly rejects the second plank. The second plank, that new official estimates 
of labour productivity are markedly higher than earlier unofficial estimates, is 
apparently considered by Peetz to be of insufficient consequence to warrant any 
reconsideration of (1) Dalziel's (2002) outdated data and the implications that 
spring from it or (2) Peetz's own earlier analyses (Peetz 2005, 2006) that draw, 
in part, from Dalziel. 
Quiggin (2007) shares a similar perspective on New Zealand's perceived poor 
labour productivity record to that of O'Connor and Peetz. He writes that: 
No country undertook more radical institutional restructuring in the 1980s and 
1990s and, for quite a few years, flights into Wellington were packed with 
international delegations seeking to learn from the Kiwi miracle. 
Sadly, the miracle never arrived. 
There have been some recent attempts to defend New Zealand's record in 
this period. While statistics can be selected to prove almost anything, the 
facts are inescapable. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the rate of growth of 
gross domestic product in New Zealand was well below that for both Australia 
and the OECD. 
Performance has improved since the late 1990s. Probably coincidentally, 
this followed the election of Helen Clark's Labour government, which raised 
marginal tax rates, and repealed the Employment Contracts Act. If there is a 
relationship between institutions and productivity, the New Zealand example 
suggests it is not a simple case of free markets good, intervention bad. 
Quigg in's comments about New Zealand's relatively weak GOP growth are worth 
amplifying, as it is true that the relative position of New Zealand has decreased 
over much of the last fifty years or so. Figure 4 illustrates this. It charts per capita 
real GOP (rather than straight real GOP) for Australia and New Zealand as a ratio 
of OECD4 per capita GOP from 1950 to 2006, using TCB/GGDC (2007) data.5 
It is notable that New Zealand's position relative to the OECD average declined 
quite strongly over the period 1950 to the early 1990s (around 1992). Since 
the early 1990s, New Zealand's position has stabilized relative to the OECD 
average. Australia's position also declined relative to the OECD between 1950 
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and the early 1990s (around 1991) as Figure 4 indicates. The relative decline in 
Australia, however, was considerably shallower than the decline in New Zealand. 
Moreover, since the early 1990s, Australia's position relative to that of the OECO 
has generally improved. Thus since 1996 Australia's per capita GOP has been 
greater than the OECO average, a situation not achieved on a sustained basis 
since the late 1970s. 
Figure 4: Per Capita GOP for New Zealand and Australia Relative to 
OECD 
TCB/GGDC Estimated EKS 2006 $US GOP 
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Source: The Conference Board and Groningen Growth and Development Centre (TCB/GGDC, 
2007). 
The data in Figure 4 paint a different picture, in some ways, to the one painted 
by Quiggin, O'Connor and Peetz. For example, per capita GOP in New Zealand, 
relative to the OECO average, ceased falling during the years of the ECA and 
after, with New Zealand's per capita GOP averaging a little below 80 per cent 
that of the OECO. The years of the ECA and later can thus be viewed as being 
associated with a stabilization in the relative position of New Zealand, at least in 
terms of per capita GOP 
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3. Measurement and Interpretive Cautions 
Official New Zealand productivity estimates are based on a range of basic survey 
source material. Labour productivity is calculated by dividing an index of real 
value-added output by an index of total hours worked (or a proxy thereof). There 
are numerous measurement issues associated with the practicalities of estimating 
labour productivity, as well as capital and multifactor productivity. Here we will 
focus on some of the measurement issues associated with the estimation of the 
total hours worked, which SNZ refers to as the 'labour input' series, as a way 
of indicating that caution needs to be exercised in the use of these estimates 
as they are generated from a number of different data sets, all of which have 
limitations. 
SNZ draws from four basic sources to generate its labour input series. These are 
identified below (SNZ 2007b ): 
o Quarterly Employment Survey (QES). This is a sample survey of 
businesses with paid employees. It provides estimates of hours paid for, 
as opposed to hours actually worked. The hours-paid-for data stretch back 
in one form or another to 1946 and they align relatively well with major 
industry classifications 
o Business Demography Database (BOD). This is a snapshot for February 
of the employment and production profile of New Zealand enterprises. 
o Household Labour Force Survey (HLFS). This is a quarterly sample 
survey that gives estimates of, among other things, employed persons 
and hours of work. These data are available from March 1986. 
o Census of Population and Dwellings (Census). This is a 5-yearly census 
of New Zealand dwellings. It gives estimates of the number of employed 
persons plus estimates of hours worked. The data in the labour volume 
index correspond to census estimates, according to SNZ (2007b). 
Table 1 indicates the various sources used to generate the measured sector's 
labour input series. While all of these data sources are used to some extent to 
generate the labour input series, the principal source of data on hours worked 
is the QES, rather than the HLFS. The advantages of the QES are, as indicated 
above, that it stretches back much further into the past and better aligns, when 
subdivided, with various industry categories (Ede eta/., 2006). This is important 
because SNZ plans to backdate its productivity estimates, in the first instance 
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to 1978, and to develop industry-level productivity estimates along similar lines 
to ABS industry estimates. 
Table 1: Source Series Used to Construct Labour Input (Total 
Hours) 
Data source for Data source 
Industry Data source for Data source for working proprietor for working 
employee count employee hours count proprietor hours 
QES indus- Census/HLFS Census/ 
tries BDD/QES jobs QES paid hours count HLFS usual hours 
Census/HLFS Census/HLFS Census/HLFS Census/ Agriculture 
count usual hours count HLFS usual hours 
Services to Census/HLFS Census/HLFS Census/HLFS Census/ 
agriculture count usual hours count HLFS usual hours 
Commercial Census/HLFS Census/HLFS Census/HLFS Census/ 
fishing count usual hours count HLFS usual hours 
Source: Adapted from SNZ (2007) p. 13. 
According to SNZ: 
Using establishment surveys ensures consistency with other component series 
of productivity. The QES and BOD largely survey the same enterprises that 
are covered by the data sources feeding into the output and capital series. 
The annual change in hours paid at the aggregate level is not significantly 
different from the annual change in actual hours worked. For productivity 
purposes, the main interest is in the annual growth of volume series. It is 
assumed that the annual growth of hours paid is a good proxy for the growth 
of actual hours worked. (SNZ, 2007b, pp.1 0-11, italics added). 
The foregoing comments suggest that little is lost from using the QES data as 
opposed to the HLFS data. Indeed, during the ECA years between 1991 and 
2000, both HLFS and QES estimates of (respectively) 'total hours worked' and 
'total hours paid for', depicted in Figure 5, increased by 22 per cent (using March 
data as does SNZ when estimating its labour productivity series).6 
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Figure 5: Hours Actually Worked (HLFS) Data versus Hours Paid (QES) 
Data 
New Zealand Total Hours of Work - March Trend Values 
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Note: QES data scale on right-hand side 
Sources: Statistics New Zealand, Household Labour Force Survey (HLFS) Table 61.900-09 
Total Hours Worked and Quarterly Employment Survey (QES) Table 63.901-03 Total Paid 
Hours via EconData. 
SNZ also notes the following with respect to the QES and casual employment: 
The collected data relates to paid employees of all ages but casual labour is nol 
well covered. This is particularly relevant during periods where environmental 
factors affect the composition of the labour force. For example, one such change 
occurred in 1991 when the Employment Contracts Act (ECA) came into force. 
One objective of the ECA was to increase flexibility in the labour market; it is 
quite likely that along with this increased flexibility came an increase in the 
number of casual workers. (SNZ, 2007b, p.14, italics added) 
How might this qualification be interpreted? If, for example, on the one hand, 
the underlying growth rate of full-time employment has been overstated and the 
underlying growth rate of casual employment has been understated, then this 
may mean that the actual overall growth rate of total hours worked has to be 
adjusted down and labour productivity growth adjusted up. On the other hand, if it 
is assumed that the underlying growth rate of casual workers is greater than that 
of full-time workers, and the underlying growth rates do not need to be adjusted, 
Perry 101 
but the 'initial' number of casual workers needs to be adjusted up, then this 
scenario may mean that the actual overall growth rate of total hours worked has 
to be adjusted up and labour productivity growth adjusted down. In either case, 
it seems likely that the adjustments would be relatively minor. 
The overall implication of these limitations, it is suggested, is that there is a need 
for caution in the claims made for labour and other measures of productivity. 
While SNZ has produced the most meticulously sourced and computed estimates 
of productivity to date, we should not be surprised if later revisions change the 
shape of the series thus far developed. 
There is another reason to be guarded in the claims made for these data. Although 
the SNZ data suggest a significantly higher rate of growth in labour productivity 
than had previously been estimated, and although the SNZ estimates of labour 
productivity growth data suggest that the years of the ECA were years of high labour 
productivity growth -at least for the measured sector- it may be presumptuous to 
attribute all or most of this to labour-market legislative arrangements. To be sure, 
the association over time is highly suggestive. Nevertheless, many other factors 
contribute to labour productivity, and this paper has not attempted to determine 
the relative importance of these. 
4. Conclusions 
The central purpose of this paper has been to review the arguments and evidence 
advanced recently that dismiss, in one way or another, any positive contribution 
that individualising workplace contracts may have had on labour market productivity 
and/or per capita GOP. This paper has argued that recent estimates of labour 
productivity from SNZ indicate that, during the years of the ECA, labour productivity 
growth was relatively high. It was comparable to, in fact a little higher than, labour 
productivity growth experienced in Australia, and certainly much higher than earlier 
estimates suggested. It is important to emphasise that this is not a criticism of those 
earlier productivity estimates. Those estimates drew on information available at 
the time. These new official estimates are best viewed as providing an enriching 
new source of information from which to further develop our understanding of the 
dimensions and complexities of productivity growth. Nor should we be surprised 
if there are further refinements and developments that might re-shape the data 
themselves as well as our interpretation of them. 
That said, it is important actually to recognise these new data from SNZ and to 
incorporate them into our various attempts to understand and sensibly interpret 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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their political and economic implications. Ignoring the evidence is ultimately 
counterproductive. 
Endnotes 
1 The claim that 'the New Zealand economy lost almost two per cent of GOP between 
1987 and 1998' is not confirmed. TCB/GGDC (2007) estimate a real GOP increase of 33 
per cent. It is true that the compounded annual growth rate of real GOP for New Zealand 
was 1.6 per cent less than for Australia - which is perhaps more aligned to the point 
O'Connor is seeking to make. 
2 TCB/GGDC refers to The Conference Board and Groningen Growth and Development 
Centre. This body, located at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands (http://www. 
ggdc.net/), specialises in the analysis of productivity. It encourages research into all matters 
related to productivity and provides internet access to historical data on productivity for 
most of the countries of the world 
3 In this paper we shall not review the short-term gyrations of labour productivity and other 
indicators as these data are frequently subject to major revisions and offer too short a 
period for drawing reliable conclusions. 
4 The OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries included 
are the member countries as at 1973. United Germany is included from 1991, West 
Germany prior to this. 
5 A number of interpolations have had to be made for the earlier years. Nevertheless, the 
basic direction of change is unlikely to be affected. GOP per capita data are expressed in 
2006 US$ (converted to 2006 price levels with updated 2002 EKS PPPs). 
6 See references appended to Figure 5. 
References 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2006), Productivity, 5204.0 November. 
http: I lw w w. a b s. go v. au I AU SST AT S I a b s@. nsf I La t c s t products I 
5204.0Main%20Fcatures92005-06?opendocumcnt&tabname=Summary&prodno= 
5204.0&issue=2005-06&num=&view= Accessed 21 March 2007. 
Black, M., Guy, M. and Mclelland, N. (2003), 'Productivity in New Zealand 1988-
2002', New Zealand Economic Papers, vol. 37, pp. 119-50. 
Blackwood, L., Feinberg-Danieli, G. and Lafferty, G. (2006), 'Unions and Union 
Membership in New Zealand: Annual Review for 2004', New Zealand Journal 
of Employment Relations, vol. 30, pp 1- 11. 
Perry 103 
Dalziel, P. (2002), 'New Zealand's Economic Reforms: An Assessment', Review 
of Political Economy, vol. 14, pp. 31-46. 
Deeks, J. and Rasmussen, E. (2002), Employment Relations in New Zealand, 
Prentice Hall, Auckland. 
Diewert, E. and Lawrence, S. (1999), 'Measuring New Zealand's Productivity', 
Treasury Working Paper 99/5, New Zealand Treasury, Wellington. 
Dolman, B., Parham, D. and Zheng, S. (2007), 'Can Australia match US Productivity 
Performance', Staff Working Paper, Productivity Commission. 
Ede, A., Mai, B. and Cook, J. (2006), Productivity June 2006, Statistics New 
Zealand. http://www.nzae.org.nz/conferences/2006/58-MAJ-EDE-COOK.pdf 
Accessed 3 April 2007 
Moore, D. (2005), '"WorkChoices" (Sic) Less Flexible, More Complicated and 
Still Unfair? A Failure to Understand that the Market "Balances" Bargaining 
Power', Address to the Institute for Private Enterprise, ALSF Conference 3 
December. 
http://www.hrnicholls.com.au/Special/desmooreALSFconf05.pdf. Accessed 20 
March 2007. 
O'Connor, B. (2007), 'Industrial Relations', Speech to the Australian Higher 
Education Industrial Association, 16 March, http://www.alp.org.au/media/0307/ 
spe160.php. Accessed 20 March 2007. 
151 Academics (2005), 'Research Evidence About the Effects of the 'WorkChoices' 
Bill', A Submission to the Enquiry into the Workplace Relations Amendment 
(WorkChoices) Bill2005 by A Group of One Hundred and Fifty One Australian 
Industrial Relations, Labour Market, and Legal Academics, November 
2005. 
Pearson, C. (2007), 'Pie-in-the-sky productivity', Weekend Australian, 27-28 
January, p. 30 (Inquirer). 
Peetz, D. (2005), 'Hollow Shells: The alleged Link Between Individual Contracting 
and Productivity Growth', The Journal of Australian Political Economy, No. 
56, pp. 32-54. 
Peetz, D. (2006), Brave New Work Place. How Individual Contracts Are Changing 
Our Jobs, Allen and Unwin, Crows Nest. 
104 Australian Bulletin of Labour 
Peetz, D. (2007), 'Brave New WorkChoices: What is the Story So Far?', paper 
presented to Diverging Employment Relations in Australia and New Zealand?, 
24th conference of the Association of Industrial Relations Academics of Australia 
and New Zealand, Auckland, NZ, 9 February. 
http://www.actu.asn.aullmages/Dynamic/attachments/5064/Peetz_%20Brave% 
20New%20Work%20Choices%20_%20What%20is%20the%20story%20so 
%20far.doc Accessed 20 March 2007. 
Perry, L. J. (2006), 'Do Workplace Contracts Harm Labour Productivity Growth? 
A Reconsideration of the Macroeconomic Evidence from New Zealand', 
Australian Economic Review, val. 39, 359-375. 
Perry, L. J. (2007), 'New Figures Work Against the Myth', Australian Financial 
Review, 23 January, p. 47. 
Productivity Commission (2007), 'Productivity' ABS Sourced. 
http://wv·.rw.pc.gov.au/conmlission/work/productivity/perfonnance/aggregate/index.html 
Accessed 21 March.2007. 
Quiggin, J. {2007), 'Still, Life's Not Bad Here', Australian Financial Review, 15 
March, p. 62. 
Rasmussen, E. (Ed.) (2004), Employment Relationships: New Zealand's 
Employment Relations Act, Auckland University Press. 
Rasmussen, E. and Lamm, F. (2005), 'From Collectivism to Individualism in New 
Zealand Employment Relations', in Baird, M., Cooper, R. and Westcott, M., 
Reworking Work: AIRAANZ 2005 (Proceedings of the 19th Conference of the 
Association of Industrial Relations Academics of Australia and New Zealand, 
Volume 1 -Refereed Papers). 
Statistics New Zealand [SNZ] (2007a), 'Productivity Statistics 1988-2006' http:// 
www.stats.govt.nz/products-and-services/hot-off-the-press/productivity-
statistics/productivity-statistics-88to06-hotp.htm?page=para022Master 
Accessed 21 March 2007. 
Statistics New Zealand [SNZ] (2007b), 'Productivity Statistics: Sources and Methods 
(updated March 2007)' http://www.stats.govt.nz/NR/rdonlyres/A7B54361-
A5B8-4ADB-B68B-OB7E3BC24A04/0/productivitysourcesmethods2007. pdf 
Accessed 21 March 2007. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Perry 105 
The Conference Board and Groningen Growth and Development Centre [TCB/ 
GGDC] (2007), 'Groningen Growth and Development Centre: Total Economy 
Database', Faculty of Economics, University of Groningen. 
http://www.ggdc.net/indcx.html. Accessed 25 March 2007. 
Victoria University of Wellington (2006), 'Record Growth in Union Membership 
(21/1 0/2006)', http://www.vuw.ac.nz/home/about victoria/news article. 
asp?ArticleiD=1042151235 Accessed 16 December.2006. 
Walsh, P., Harbridge, R. and Wilkinson, D. (2004), 'Employment Relations in New 
Zealand: The Role of the State vis-a-vis the Labour Movement', in Verma, A. 
and Kochan, T. A., Unions in the 2151 Century: An International Perspective, 
Palgrave Macmillan, New York. 
Wooden, M. (2006), 'Implications ofWorkChoices Legislation', Agenda -A Journal 
of Policy Analysis and Reform, vol. 13, pp. 96-116. 
